War of the Flea in the Red Sea

the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough—this is the theory—the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws. But this may be to oversimplify … In practice, the dog does not die of anemia. He merely becomes too weakened—in military terms, overextended; in political terms, too unpopular; in economic terms, too expensive—to defend himself.

Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), p. 20 (emphasis added).

Robert Taber’s study of guerilla warfare, despite limitations, offers insights into Ansarallah’s Red Sea campaign. Limitations: (i) the book is six decades old; (ii) it is not entirely original (it reformulates certain of Mao’s theories on asymmetric warfare);[1] (iii) it is based on Taber’s observations of anti-colonial and/or Marxist movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa; and (iv) focuses on land-based warfare. However, there are five characteristics to a militia’s ‘protracted war’ campaign that apply to Ansarallah’s campaign and the Yemeni situation.[2]

Five Characteristics

1. Will to revolt: belief that armed struggle is the path to political empowerment. This led to the Yemeni Civil War; intervention by Saudi Arabia (2015); and Saudi Arabia’s U.S.-backed terror-and starvation campaign against Yemeni civilians. Saudi Arabia—and its American and British backers and coalition partners—failed to break the Yemenis. The ‘will to revolt’ is alive.

2. Avoid the enemy’s strength; attack the enemy’s weaknesses. Hence missile and drone strikes on U.S./UK weaknesses: civilian vessels. Target where possible the enemy’s navy vessels and learn from his defensive actions by obtaining electronic intelligence and such.

• Targeting enemy weaknesses is not unique, but what makes Ansarallah’s actions critical is the ‘application of guerrilla activity [drone & missile strikes], in a conscious and deliberate way, to [achieve] specific political objectives.’[3] Ansarallah’s political objective is clear; it has been articulated frequently: ceasefire in Gaza.

3. Three-stage Protracted War: This was articulated by Mao.[4]

• Ansarallah is in the 3rd-stage: strategic counter-offensive. This is intended to lead to ‘the enemy’s strategic retreat.’ In the short-term this means end of the U.S.-led Red Sea mission to protect ships headed to Israel; but in the long-term, expulsion of U.S. forces from West Asia.[5]

4. Energize the base and sustain popular support.

• The U.S.-backed terror-and starvation campaign in Gaza energizes Yemenis;
• Every Friday, after prayers, millions of Yemenis assemble to demonstrate their support for Palestinians;
• Crowds at the Friday assemblies voice opposition to relentless U.S./UK airstrikes that have killed hundreds of innocent Yemenis;
• Opponents of Ansarallah, observing that popular support within Yemen is with Ansarallah, have shifted positions toward Ansarallah.
• Popular support—key to a ‘protracted people’s war’—is on Ansarallah’s side.

5. Actions by the enemy benefit the militia: U.S./UK air campaign against Yemen has failed to achieve any discernible military success; but has infuriated Ansarallah and the Yemeni peoples through indiscriminate bombings and killings.

‘Guerillas [read here: Ansarallah] who know their trade and have popular support cannot be eliminated by the means available to most governments.’[6] This will not end well for U.S./UK.

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[1] This should not detract. Taber incorporates ideas from thinkers like Vo Nguyen Giap.

[2] On ‘protracted war’ (also ‘protracted people’s war’), see Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967). The gist: A militia builds and retains the support of the people, while striking the enemy hither-and-yon and then melting away. The enemy commits increasing amounts of economic and military resources to the war; this become an unsustainable burden over the long-term; the enemy folds. Vietnam War is the example.

[3] Taber, War of the Flea, 17.

[4] Mao, Protracted War, ¶¶ 35–50.

[5] See my article, IRGC and Shiʿa Militias in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon: ‘Why We Fight.’

[6] Taber, War of the Flea, 18.