Iran: Crossing the Nuclear Rubicon

Signals from Tehran indicate either that a shift in its nuclear weapons policy has taken place, or policy review is ongoing within power circles. A Senior IRGC commander, Ahmad Haghtalab, said: Israel’s provocations may lead Tehran ‘to revise and deviate from the previously declared nuclear policies and considerations.’ My view is that Iran has already ‘crossed the Rubicon.’

Tehran’s perspective is that: (a) Israel has been acting lawlessly and irrationally since 7 October; (b) the ‘collective west’ does nothing to control Tel Aviv (viz., continuation of the slaughter in Gaza; and U.S. support for IDF’s 1 April 2024 strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus); (c) protects Israel politically (e.g., suppressing pro-Palestine protests in cities in the UK, EU, and US; and at Columbia University through police action; and suppression of free speech online: TikTok ban, Facebook, IG, Twitter, etc.) and diplomatically (e.g., use of American veto at UNSC); and (d) supplies Israel with weapons—and just added $26 billion more at the expense of long-suffering U.S. taxpayers. A nuclear weapon, therefore, will serve as a deterrent should an increasingly-unhinged Israeli leadership do the unthinkable. ‘Irrationally’ is the critical term. A rational leader will not use nuclear weapons, but a desperate Netanyahu may.

My 16 April 2024 article, ‘Has Iran Shifted its Stance on Nuclear Weapons?, has a question mark. I no longer think there is serious doubt. Journalist Elijah Magnier, and UK Member of Parliament George Galloway, are well-informed by sources in or close to Iranian ‘officialdom.’ Their statements (see the videos below) are shrewd analyses that reflect viewpoints in IRGC, and serve also as warnings to the ‘collective west’ about Iran’s current pathway.

Lastly, Israelis seem convinced that IRGC was sending a message regarding its nuclear capability. A booster from a missile that was used in the successful Iranian raid of 13-14 April fell (conveniently?) into the Dead Sea (see image above). It is of the type that ‘may in the future carry a nuclear warhead,’ i.e., it has the appropriate specifications to deliver a nuclear warhead. This was confirmed for me on 23 April by an Iranian ballistic missile specialist. Thus, IRGC has the means of delivery; IRGC only needs the correct ‘cap’ to fit on top of the missile.