Reproduced below with an update to my tweet (X: @S_Mahendrarajah) from 12 April 2024 on how IRGC is generating ‘chatter’ to deceive the enemy’s (U.S. and Israel) electronic and human intelligence systems during IRGC’s preparations for the 14 April attack on Israel.
Updated Following Iranian Raid on Israel
Clearly, IRGC was successful. The closest the enemy came to identifying the number of drones and missiles to be launched was one hundred; but NY Times reports that IRGC Aerospace launched ‘185 drones, 36 cruise missiles, and 110 surface-to-surface [ballistic] missiles’ toward Israel. The date of the attack, launch locations (of which there were many), and targets in Israel were also concealed by IRGC. American intelligence was daily claiming an attack was ‘imminent’ or in the ‘next 24-48 hours,’ and had no clue as to the targets. Iranian concealment and deceit operations were successful.
Concealment and Deceit
Daily headlines that an Iranian strike is ‘imminent’ or ‘in 48 hours’ prompt me to explain the military and intelligence purposes that lead Iran to feed data to U.S. intel sources. This in turn generates news headlines. These purposes include PSYOPS, concealment (by Iran of their plans), and deceit (of Israel). The Russian terms Maskirovka (concealment; маскировка) and Dezinformatsiya (deception; дезинформация) are popular—among an older generation of intel analysts—given KGB’s superlative use of Dezinformatsiya to advance Maskirovka. Iranians are no slouches in this respect if IRGC’s operations in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria are yardsticks. But this will be IRGC’s biggest op yet.
The goal is for Iran to conceal its activities while deceiving Israel and USA. Disinformation is used as an ‘active measure’ to advance deception.
Preparations for war generate electronic communications (‘chatter’) and physical movements of people and equipment. ‘Chatter’ are the electronic signals and communications captured by SIGINT (signals intelligence) services (NSA, GCHQ, etc.). Even if an intercepted signal (e.g. email) is encrypted and the ciphertext cannot be decrypted, its existence suggests ongoing activity. To illustrate, if an officer at a missile depot in Camp X rarely receives a call from Tehran, but now receives calls daily, pattern analysis indicates that something is going on. Thus, it benefits IRGC to generate activities—electronic chatter and physical movements—that are harvested by enemy electronic intelligence systems. The best place to hide a needle is in a stack of needles. IRGC will generate needless activities to feed the enemy. Hence headlines like ‘Khatm al-Anbiya base is on high alert’; and ‘Iran is deploying air defenses around Tehran’ (this was done long ago, although more units may be added). Somewhere in the midst of these ‘needles’ is hidden the real ‘needle.’ An added benefit is that IRGC intelligence and the Ministry of Intelligence will be able to identify leaks by individuals (human intel; HUMINT) and compromises to their electronic communications systems. If, for example, a headline appears that ‘100 drones and missiles will be launched,’ this will help intel officers identify the source(s) of the information.
Perspectives 
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