Democratization of Warfare: Iran Edition

I published an essay “Democratization of Warfare: Abrams vs. Ghoul” in March. This update relates to the impending clash between Iran and Israel/U.S. Will Iran be able to overwhelm Israeli and American defenses?

**Note Alborz (N/NW) and Zagros mountain ranges**

Democratizing Firepower

“Democratization of warfare” is where “states with limited economic resources can obtain military technologies that nullify multi-billion-dollar American weapons systems.” In my piece on Russia-Ukraine, I demonstrated that the $10,000,000 Abrams tank fares badly against $500 Russian drones because “Russians and Iranians have developed asymmetrical doctrines to counter [U.S.] arms and armor by investing in drone, missile, and electronic warfare [EW] technologies.” William Schryver refers to this same concept as “democratization of firepower.” He published an analysis, “Magazine Depth and Shields,” on how the U.S. stacks up against Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.

The U.S. defense budget is ca. $1 trillion; the Iranian defense budget is ca. 2% of the U.S. budget. The American perception is that because their military equipment is expensive and “Made in USA,” it is superior to Russian, Chinese, and Iranian technologies. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that American arms and armor can be neutralized by smarter and cheaper new generation technologies, viz., miscellaneous drones, missiles, and EW. We know that Iran has battle-tested certain weapons in the Ukraine (e.g., members of the Shahid UAV family). Indeed, the Shahid-136 (Geran-2 in Russian service) has performed magnificently.

Iran’s April Strike

Claim of 99% interception rate by Israel and Allies is “is a tale told by an idiot…signifying nothing.” Non-Western outlets have published analyses that show the opposite of the “propaganda journalism” propagated by the “collective West.”[1] Schryver analyzed Iran’s April strike, noting that Iran, using “antiquated” drones and cruise missiles as “decoys,” followed up with a handful of newer ballistic missile models (Khybar-Shekan aeroballistic missile) that “blew right through” American and Israeli interceptors. He adds, “Patriot systems were a total bust [and] summarily retired [by Israel] in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian strike.”[2] Relatedly, “Deep Dive Defense,” a YouTube channel managed by an Iranian aerospace engineer, has “inside baseball” analyses of Iranian weapons utilized in April, specifically, the Shahid-136, Emad, Khybar-Shekan, Paveh; and Israeli air defense systems, Arrow 2, Arrow 3 and 4, and David’s Sling. Technical analyses of Iranian systems alone are helpful, but the underlying tactical and strategic thinking of IRGC is very illuminating: IRGC systems were designed to be cost-effective, mass produced, and to counter specific American and Israeli weapons systems.

Iranian Missile Cities

Cost efficiencies are critical to IRGC because, as one IRGC commander quipped, “we produce missiles like cigarettes. The biggest problem we have is space to store the missiles.” Videos below are exemplars of IRGC missile cities.

Video 1 of 2

One Iranian analyst (X: @Pataramesh) opined there may be ca. 25 missile cities. These are scattered throughout Iran, especially beneath the Alborz and Zagros mountains. The sites are hardened against “bunker busters” and tactical nuclear warheads. Underground facilities are used for development and manufacturing of drones and missiles, i.e., concealed from electronic eyes. The U.S. military has no real intelligence on what is being developed and manufactured. The scope and size of IRGC’s missile arsenal is speculative. Missiles and drones are tested, but only approved imagery is released by the authorities, usually for marketing and deterrence value. The same Iranian analyst said, based on launches in April 13-14, it is possible for IRGC to simultaneously launch 1,500 MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile; i.e., capable of reaching Israel and U.S. military assets in West Asia). This just for liquid-propellant launches. Solid-propellant launches would increase the size of the salvoes arcing toward Israel and U.S. military assets. Israeli and American air defense (AD) systems struggled to handle the relatively small salvo of April 13-14; they will be overwhelmed by salvoes multiplied by factors of ten or more; and collapse if there are sustained salvoes. Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) on ships and air defense batteries have limited supplies of interceptors. Moreover, in the April 13-14 round, Israel and Allies fired an estimated $1.5 billion of interceptors—and failed to intercept the Khybar-Shekan ballistic missile. Most of Khybar-Shekan’s MaRV warheads struck their targets.

Video 2 of 2

U.S. Military Posture in West Asia

The White House and Pentagon have deployed additional ships to West Asia for the benefit of Israel. Every single U.S. Navy ship is at risk should war with Iran ensue.

The U.S. has practiced “gunboat diplomacy” since 1853.[3] The U.S. tries to intimidate Iran by sending naval vessels, usually aircraft carrier strike groups (CSG) to the Persian Gulf. Iranians suffered this annoyance in silence while developing their “Ballistic Missile ‘Ring of Fire’.” Today, every U.S. land and naval asset within the Ring’s 2,000+ km radius is vulnerable to an array of ballistic missiles, land and sea cruise missiles, drones, and EW technologies.

The American flotilla at Iran’s doorstep will include two CSGs (USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Teddy Roosevelt), i.e., two aircraft carriers (CVN prefix), eleven guided-missile destroyers (DDG prefix) and one submarine bearing cruise missiles (SSGN 79). Schryver noted that each guided-missile destroyer has dedicated about one-third of VLS slots for Tomahawk cruise missiles (ca. 500 Tomahawks), with the balance allocated to air defense interceptors and anti-ship missiles.

**Figure 2: 20 August 2024 (not all vessels noted)**

Tehran expects U.S. to employ its ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems in defense of Israel—as it did April 13-14; however, should the U.S. take offensive action against Iran, such as by launching aircraft or Tomahawks, IRGC will target one or both aircraft carriers. A carrier does not have to be sunk. If a carrier’s deck is damaged, its air wings are grounded, or if airborne, unable to land. If escorts are struck or run short of VLS interceptors, they will flee—as HMS Diamond fled the Red Sea for VLS reloading. A carrier than loses one or more of its escorts will be compelled to depart.

I will not get into attack capabilities of the air wings, and Iran’s AD capabilities, because the post will be too long. I note, however, that Tomahawks, the missile set to be launched against Iran, is an old system. Tomahawks were effective against countries with limited AD: Iraq (1991, 2003), Afghanistan (2001), Syria (2017); and against madrasas, goat-herders, and baby milk factories. However, in 2024, the U.S. Navy will be firing forty-year-old technology into the heart of Iran’s sophisticated air defense shield. In Ukraine, more advanced cruise missiles (e.g., Storm Shadow) were defeated by Russian AD systems. Iran has comparable AD systems to track and kill cruise missiles.

April 13-14 strike was a “gentle tap”

Analysis

Based on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, I can state with confidence that there are smart intelligence analysts in the U.S. Armed Forces and “intelligence community” who are aware of the perils ahead, but whose views will be disregarded by CENTCOM, JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the White House. Factions in the U.S., and the State of Israel, are invested in war with Iran. Israel has been agitating for the Iran War since 9/11. Hostile action by the U.S. against Iran is quite likely.

The U.S. Government is hubristic. They believe that the U.S. cannot be defeated by a nation with a tiny defense budget. This view is expressed in many circles, from essays by scholars at think-tanks to thoughtful analysts on social media—and idiots with Twitter accounts. For example, OSINT Defender, about whom I have written, reflects the view of Iran as a backward country that will be returned to the Stone Age by superior American technology. OSINT Defender is a naïf who Cannot even Capitalize a Sentence correctly, but has 1.2 million followers that lap up his asinine observations.

The eminent philosopher, Yogi Berra, said, “It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” However, I can state with high confidence that the U.S. Navy will suffer badly if Washington decides to test Tehran’s resolve.

Curveballs (“Googly” in British English)

Several systems about which little is known that the U.S. will encounter in a conflict with Iran. They include the Keyhan mobile radar system, which can detect stealth aircraft; Sahand-2 portable ELINT system, which can be deployed around Israel, i.e., in Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, to triangulate the position of Israeli missile defense systems; a recently-unveiled sea cruise missile (possibly supersonic); Iranian container ship that is a disguised missile launch system, holding 16 or more ballistic missiles (estimated range, 700-1000 km).