The Euro Troika is threatening to “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran. But Tehran has a history of combatting pressure with pressure. What are Tehran’s options?
Background
UN sanctions imposed during the 2006–10 period were lifted under the 2025 JCPOA, with a ten-year provision expiring 18 October 2025 whereby any party to JCPOA can trigger “snapback” if they allege Iranian non-compliance with JCPOA. Once triggered, the resolution is referred to UNSC, which must vote within 30 days on whether sanctions relief will be continued. Vetoes by permanent members are disallowed; the measure needs 9 of 15 votes to pass (on “snapback,” see here, here, and here).
The Euro Troika (DE, FR, UK) is threatening to use “snapback” to pressure Iran. The Troika is doing Israel’s bidding. If the 18 Oct 2025 deadline passes without “snapback,” the Troika loses a weapon. So, the Troika is expected to use it before they lose it.
Since Iran is heavily-sanctioned by the U.S., UK, and EU, including U.S. secondary sanctions that already deter countries and corporations from trading with Iran, UN sanctions following “snapback” will have marginal effects on Iran’s economy. But Tehran will be incensed.
Maximum Pressure Meets Maximum Pressure
Iran does not retreat (update, 8 June 2025: essay in the American Conservative on how Iran responds to pressure). When Trump quit JCPOA in 2018 at Netanyahu’s behest, he imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions. Iran responded with its own “maximum pressure” by, inter alia, installing additional (and better) centrifuges, and enriching vast quantities of Highly-Enriched Uranium (see 26 Feb 2025 IAEA report). BBC, which claims to have seen a confidential report, states: IAEA “said Iran now possesses over 400kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity [i.e., 60% HEU]—well above the level used for civilian purposes and close to weapons grade, and a near 50% increase in three months.”
As of 17 May 2025, Iran has 408.6 kg 60% HEU, sufficient for 18-24 warheads without enriching to 90% HEU, or for 70 one kiloton low-yield warheads.
This is what the Troika and U.S. are complaining about. However, Tehran’s perspective is that JCPOA was voided by the bad faith actions of the U.S. and the Troika: (1) U.S. unilaterally quit JCPOA and imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions that hurt Iran and its peoples; (2) the Troika, by enforcing Trump’s sanctions, violated their obligations under JCPOA. Iran, therefore, has the freedom to enrich Uranium to any quantity and any level of purity.
Tehran’s Options
- Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The Islamic Republic of Iran is constrained only by the NPT, which was ratified by the ancien regime in 1974. IRI has complied with NPT in good faith, but IAEA has been weaponized by U.S. and Troika, and NPT is used as a cudgel against IRI. NPT may get booted like the ancien regime.
- ICBM Tests: Iran has voluntarily restricted the ranges of its missiles to a maximum of 2,000 km, but has the ability to swiftly adjust the ranges of existing missiles. It also has an ICBM program (see video), but no ICBM test flight has been demonstrated. Tehran may choose to demonstrate its ability to target the Troika (London, Paris, and Berlin).
- Advanced Enrichment: Iran will install IR-9 centrifuges that enrich faster. In short, Iran will continue to increase its 60% HEU stockpile, but faster than before. For context, Iran added 200 kg of enriched uranium to its stockpile in three months (Feb. to May 2025). If it exits NPT, then Tehran will probably enrich to 90% HEU.
- Nuclear Warhead Test: Iran has mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle—from the uranium mine to the nuclear power plant. It has ballistic missile superiority (as the Israelis are aware). From this point on, it’s 1940s technology: building a warhead, but that, too, Iran has mastered (see nuclear posture video 1 and video 2). Iran’s hesitation vis-à-vis nuclear testing is primarily to avoid starting a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, but if circumstances change, they will test a warhead.
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