Iran War: Failures in US Generalship

American generals have failed so badly in the Iran War that they are reduced to crowdsourcing (by email) for ideas on combatting Iran. Almost everyone (“regardless of rank”) can chime in.

Revelation by CNN

“We are looking for new creative and unconventional ways to pressure and punish Iran,” an officer in US Central Command’s [CENTCOM] intelligence branch wrote in a message sent Wednesday [29 July] to a broad group of military analysts, according to a source familiar with the message. A second source also said that a senior US military officer sent the message last week soliciting new ideas for how to deal with Iran…“Admiral Cooper, in particular, reaches out to members of our great team, regardless of rank, to achieve the highest levels of operational performance possible.”

—CNN, 3 August 2026—

Absence of Strategy

“Strategy? We don’t need no stinkin’ strategy!”—to adapt a famous line from The Treasure of the Sierra Madre—is the established U.S. military practice, from Korea to Iran. In Vietnam, Andrew Krepinevich wrote in The Army and Vietnam, the U.S. military employed “a strategy of tactics,” substituting tactical metrics for a coherent strategic and political framework.

American generals have tons of “fruit salad” on their uniforms—Purple Hearts for ouchies and participation medals—but they have not won a major war since the Japanese surrender in 1945: Korea (draw), Vietnam (defeat), Iraq I (draw), Iraq II (defeat), Afghanistan (defeat), Iran (defeat). American generals are a club of mediocrities (“Club Med”).

Club Med (2001-2021)

US generals revealed their mediocrity during the 20-year “global war on terror.” Two critiques are LTC Paul Yingling’s “A failure in generalship,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 May 2007; and LTC Daniel Davis’s , “Purge the Generals,” Armed Forces Journal, 1 Aug 2013. There are, of course, manifold studies and post-mortems of both wars by academics and military analysts.

Key takeaways: US generals failed in two crucial areas: (1) strategy in Afghanistan and in Iraq; and (2) understanding the changing character of war.

“Changing character of war”: the tools, tactics, and technologies of warfare evolve, but war’s fundamental nature, as Carl von Clausewitz has articulated, remain exactly the same: violent, unpredictable, and political. 

In sum, the nature of war is eternal but the character of war evolves.

CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks had no strategy for Afghanistan and Iraq. He assumed, first with the Afghan War (2001/02), and then with the Iraq War (2003), that each war will end once the enemy’s capital fell. Generals never prepared for post-war stabilization operations in AFG and IRQ, nor anticipate insurgencies. Generals failed to recognize the character of the war in IRQ and AFG. When confronted by insurgencies in IRQ and AFG, every commanding general employed a “strategy of tactics”—just as their predecessors had done in Vietnam.

Ricardo Sanchez (Iraq) and Mark Milley (Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff) exhibited unparalleled incompetence. Milley, architect of the 2021 retreat from Afghanistan, exhibited poor foresight and planning. Generals that have stood out (for being less incompetent) are George Casey (for being a good bureaucrat in Iraq) and John Abizaid (for recognizing that the US faced a “classic guerilla campaign” in Iraq).

A culture of mediocrity has taken hold within the Army’s leadership rank—if it is not uprooted, the country’s next war is unlikely to unfold any better than the last two.

—Tom Ricks, “General Failure,” Atlantic, 15 November 2012—

Club Med and the Iran War

The “next war” is Iran—and the generals are failing miserably.

Dan Caine, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has an unimpressive career. He was selected by Trump despite not meeting USC Title 10 requirements. Rumor is that he’s a MAGA cultist. It does not matter if another general had been nominated: the Pentagon’s gene pool is shallow.

Admiral Brad Cooper, CENTCOM Commander, is clearly struggling: the email revealed by CNN was sent at his behest (“Admiral Cooper… reaches out to members of our great team, regardless of rank…”). According to The Grayzone’s journalist, Max Blumenthal, Adm. Cooper is colluding with Mark Dubovitz, the head of an Israeli think-tank in Washington, D.C., to escalate the war. Escalation does not benefit the US, but will advance Israel’s agenda.

Entrants to Club Med are selected by sycophantic and unimaginative men (and women) who want men (and women) like themselves at the Officers’ Mess, Service Birthday Balls, banquets, galas, committees, etc. Club Med’s membership committee—an Internal Selection Board of generals sends vetted nominations to the White House, which submits the names to Congress for approval—will blackball any candidate deemed a “boat rocker”—an independent-minded innovator. Mediocrity is passed from generation to generation.