The “Second Imposed War” is upon Iran. Essay sifts through media chaff to offer a political-military SITREP (16 June 2025).
I. Perceptions
Israel enjoys free positive publicity; whereas Iran suffers the opposite. Israel benefits from mythical, often hagiological, narratives: Israel could conduct a genocide in Gaza and be praised by media in the “collective west” (US, CAN, UK, EU, NZ, AUS) for exercising “restraint” and for being “the most moral army in the world.” Whereas Iran is the “biggest sponsor of terrorism” and “the regime is hated by Iranians” (NB: “regime” is utilized to de-legitimize the Islamic Republic).
Scans of BBC, CNN, Foxnews, Daily Telegraph, Times of London, NY Times, WashPost, etc. will leave viewers and readers with the impression that Israel delivered a death blow to the Islamic Republic, which is tottering. “King” Reza Shah Pahlavi and Benjamin Netanyahu called on Iranians to “rise up against the regime,” and for police and military to defect to the “opposition.” Western assessments of Iran (2025) parallel Adolf Hitler’s assessment of USSR (1941): “We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.”
II. Realities
Iran’s economy has indeed been weakened by decades of economic sanctions, and fiscal and economic mismanagement. This has fueled domestic resentments towards the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI); but events since Friday the 13th show that IRI is not near collapse. Iranians from every social stratum, including prominent dissident voices, have rallied behind IRI’s political and military leaderships
(II) (a): Decapitation Strikes
The strikes that killed senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists exposed IRI’s failures in intelligence and internal security; but only marginally impacted on national defense.
(1) Israel’s de facto declaration of war meant that IRI’s Artesh (Army) is in command of IRI’s Armed Forces, including the “political” IRGC. Ayatollah Khamenei swiftly penned decrees confirming Artesh’s roles in national defense, and for related promotions and appointments.
(2) Subordinates of murdered IRGC officers were elevated. The murdered officers were cautious men, scarred by the horrors of the First Imposed War (1980-88). They authored concepts such as “strategic patience” (translation: do little beyond sending messages, as exemplified by the retaliatory strike on the U.S. base at Ayn al-Assad, Iraq, 7 Jan 2020, following Trump’s assassination of Haji Qasem). These IRGC generals preferred to use entities like Hizballah and Ansarallah to do their “dirty work”; and were reluctant to unleash IRI’s firepower on Israel in April and August 2024 lest Iran be plunged into another long and costly war. Their calibrated responses, Iranian critics argue, emboldened Israel and U.S. The assassinated Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri, was IRGC, but his replacement is Abdolrahim Mousavi, from Artesh.
(3) Command-and-control quickly resumed and IRI pummeled Israel. Operational plans, “playbooks,” are pre-prepared; they were dusted off shelves and plays run. With respect to Fri., 13 June, an astute commentator wrote, “Iranian military has truly shown ‘mission command’ and ‘empowered junior leadership.’ I don’t think American or Israeli military could have taken the losses of so many senior commanders and still struck back.” IRI unleashed strikes on Tel Aviv and three IDF bases on 13th; followed by waves of strikes on Tel Aviv and Haifa on the 14th; 15th afternoon matinee show, with the main performance in the evening.
Verdict: Israel’s decap strikes generated headlines but did not disrupt command. Israel killed IRGC’s “moderates”—not “hardliners” as Trump claimed—that favored negotiating with Israel/U.S. on the nuclear file; and sought to avoid war with Israel/U.S. The present leaderships of Artesh and IRGC are hawkish. This is evident from the strike packages delivered to Israel, 13-15 June, and the expanding target bank. An Iranian analyst wrote, “gloves are off.”
(II) (b): Iranian Air Defenses
IDF destroyed radar stations at Sobashi and Piranshahr, but claims about wrecking Iran’s sprawling and multifaceted air defense (AD) systems are patently false. IDF had relatively free run during the daylight hours of 13 June; this is when nuclear sites at Natanz and Isfahan were hit. Natanz is old and vulnerable (Iran knew this), with old (IR-1) centrifuges below the ground (but high end centrifuges, IR-6, and soon IR-9, are deep underground at Ferdow).
Iranian AD suddenly became active after 8–12 hours of “silence,” and repelled IDF intrusions. IRI claims the AD system was subjected to cyber warfare; however, a respected analyst suggested that IRI employed the “rope-a-dope” strategy from boxing (fighter has back to the ropes, invites opponent to punch, absorbs blows, tires out over-confident opponent, counter-attacks).
Let’s examine the “rope-a-dope” proffer. (1) IRI lost nothing it did not expect to lose (except for the IRGC generals and nuclear scientists). Natanz is an easy hit for IDF, but “there is no visible evidence of damage to the underground facilities.” Strikes at the nuclear center in Isfahan caused superficial damage. (2) IRI’s AD network includes mobile and fixed radar stations and SAM launchers. There are hundreds of such fixed/mobile AD components. Could IDF have struck them all?
The cyber attack theory is not “plausible given the near-total lack of any air defense response for much of the day, without even much manual antiaircraft fire seen,” but at sunset, the “siesta” ended and AD came back “at once and in full force” (ibid.). Furthermore, visual evidence has surfaced of IDF striking decoy AD. Iranians excel at the dark science of “maskirovka”—deception (as I wrote last year). A specialist wrote,
“I was personally involved in a ‘decoy’ business, and I can say with high confidence that the Iranians have developed their own approach [specifics on creating decoys follow]. I have no doubt that the Iranians have planned for this kind of scenario [and] having some knowledge of how they operate, I can confidently say that more than three-quarters of the videos circulating are actually hits on the decoys.”
Mike Mihajlovic
IDF shared videos of hits on decoys and boasted about establishing “air superiority,” even producing an animation of how IDF jets traverse over Iraq into western Iran. IDF did penetrate Iranian airspace (13 June), but once Iranian AD returned to work, intrusions ended (there are unconfirmed reports of shootdowns of IDF jets).
Israel is currently (16 June, afternoon, UK time) using three modes of attack:
1. Launching standoff weapons from Iraqi airspace, but these strikes appear to have tapered.
2. Employing Mossad teams and/or Iranian terrorists (MeK, probably) to strike targets inside Iran with FPV drones and ATGM missiles (on saboteurs, see “Israel’s hidden army inside Iran,” by Fereshteh Sadeghi)
3. Crude acts of terrorism by Mossad/allies (e.g., five car bombings in Tehran, 15 June).
Verdict: IDF does not have air superiority. Any penetration of Iranian air space comes with risks to IDF jets. After an Iranian refueling aircraft at Mashhad was struck, IDF tweeted that this target, 2,300 km from Israel, was its longest range air strike; however, the attack was from a locally-launched drone (by a Iranian terrorist group or Mossad). Will Schryver, another respected analyst, wagged of IDF’s tweet, “Israel is hard-selling the myth of ‘air superiority’.”
AD is imperfect. Russia has superior AD systems and networks, but is frequently subjected to kamikaze drones launched from NATO neighbors. Drone attacks will continue in different parts of Iran. Despite strong internal security measures, Russia suffers from attacks by infiltrators (e.g., Op. Spider Web, 1 June 2025). Iran has a pro-Israel neighbor (Azerbaijan) and separatist movements operating in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan. Iran, contrary to popular belief, had loose internal security (that just changed; security services are hunting for infiltrators). Nonetheless, terror attacks will continue. Pro-Israel media in the collective west will call them “strikes”—to convey the impression the attacks were by IDF jets—rather than call them “terrorism.” Case in point, BBC (15 June): “there are reports of strikes on residential areas, fuel depots, ministries…”
Attacks on three ministries (Tehran), University of Tehran dormitory (on Keshavarz Blvd), Hakim Children’s Hospital (Shariati St.), water & sewage pipelines (Tajrish, north Tehran), and residential buildings (several targets), are “basically ISIS tactics.” These are not the actions of an IDF that has even modest ability to penetrate Iranian airspace.
(II) (c): National Unity in Iran
When Saddam invaded Iran on 22 Sep 1980, Iran was wracked by political dissent and violence as manifold political currents jockeyed for control. Saddam assumed that Iran would fragment, with Iranian Arabs defecting to Iraq. He was wrong. Iran’s ethno-linguistically and confessionally diverse peoples united behind Khomeini’s leadership (Saddam inadvertently helped Khomeini consolidate power). Zoroastrians, Christians, Jews, Sunnis, and Shia volunteered to fight the invader. The Iranian Army was headed to Baghdad when the usual foreign actors intervened to militarily and financially support Iraq, prolonging the war and costing Iranian blood and treasure.
On 13 June 2025, political factions, dissidents, and ordinary Iranians set aside disagreements with IRI and threw support behind the military and political leaderships. I cannot reproduce in this space all the tweets, IG, TikTok, and Telegram posts voicing anger towards Israel and U.S., and support for Tehran, but samples will suffice:
Sadegh Zibakalam: “I am truly amazed by the expectations of Netanyahu, Trump, or Prince Reza Pahlavi who want me to support Israel and stand up against the regime under these circumstances. Which opposition figure has spoken and written as much as I have against this regime? But how can I join the enemy in this situation? Was it right for the MEK to join Saddam?”
Ali Gholizadeh: “I am a former political prisoner with a history of three arrests and multiple deprivations of education, teaching, and employment. Despite all my criticisms of the government, I stand fully behind the Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Defense Forces and [Armed] Forces in defending the homeland.”
Mohammad Ali Shabani: “Before the Israeli attacks, I was against 60% enrichment. But the Zionist attack on my country has brought about a clear shift in my mind. I say it loudly: Iran must acquire a nuclear bomb as soon as possible. Conducting a nuclear test is the biggest deterrent and will thwart all of Trump’s and Netanyahu’s plans.”
Western media glowingly reported on the decapitation strikes as if they were brilliant military operations; however, since some IRGC leaders and all scientists were killed in their homes, along with their spouses and children, Iranians correctly see them as terrorism. The dehumanizing of Iranians by the collective west is not lost on Iranians. In contrast, western readers were treated (ad nauseum) to sob stories about dead Israelis and hostages after 7 Oct 2023.
In subsequent IDF air strikes; ATGM and FPV strikes; and car bombings, media in the collective west have not talked about the civilians murdered by Mossad and their terrorists. But images of murdered children, and reports on the promising lives snatched by Israel, have saturated Iranian social media and media. As of 15 June 2025 (p.m.), 224 Iranians have been killed and 1,277 wounded, 90% of whom are civilians. Iranians are sad and angry, but mostly united.
Verdict: “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity,” one of the three legs of Clausewitz’s trinity of war (passion, reason, and chance), has been aroused in Iranians. AD’s “siesta” bought time for anger to build from simmer to boil. Defeating the enemy is more important that grievances about IRI. It is astounding that “King” Reza Shah Pahlavi cannot read the room. Iranians are nationalistic. They will not support any person or entity that sides with Iran’s enemies. This is the lesson of MeK: Iranians revile MeK because it sided with Saddam during the Imposed War.
Takeaways/Quick Points
1. Negotiations: President Pezeshkian, “Reformists,” and elements in IRGC pushed for negotiations because Iranians desired sanctions relief. But Trump’s duplicity in holding fake negotiations while plotting with Netanyahu to attack Iran has extinguished that hope. No sensible person makes an agreement with a president that (a) quit JCPOA in 2018; (b) held fake talks; (c) deceived the Omani foreign minister who had graciously mediated; and (d) tweeted, “I gave Iran 60 days to make a deal. Israel attacked on day 61.” Iranians will not negotiate under attack. Iranians implicitly understand that sanctions relief will materialize only when Israel is bloodied and begs for peace.
2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): In death throes. A bill being fast-tracked through Parliament (Majlis) calls for withdrawal from NPT and expulsion of IAEA. A famous video on social media shows an angry crowd, one a woman, stating how Israel has harassed Iran for 40 years and now attacked it. Time to build a nuclear bomb (she said). It is likely that Iran will test a nuclear warhead.
3. Air Superiority: IDF spokesmen are unfunny versions of “Baghdad Bob,” making outlandish claims that are disseminated uncritically by pro-Israel media. Analyst Patarames posted, “Wow! IRGC-ASF missile crews still feel so confident and safe that their launchers are firing in clusters. No dispersion. So much about Israeli air superiority over Iran…”
4. IDF AD: Is being degraded. A multitude of videos are available that show Iranian missiles passing through Israeli airspace and precisely striking targets—and IRI is not yet using its best stuff. IDF launchers are being struck and interceptor stocks depleted. Reality will bite Israelis when Iranian missiles strike with barely any IDF AD opposition. NB: “Scud hunts” of the First Persian Gulf will not be reprised. IDF is lying when it claims 120 TELs were destroyed on Sunday. Few missile launchers (TEL) will be destroyed (1% to 2% of inventory) See comment above on “firing in clusters.” No fear.
5. Rules-Based Order® (RBO®): Iranians condemned 9/11, held candlelight vigils, and supported the U.S. against AQ and Taliban. RBO® has not condemned Israeli terrorism, or repeated its tiresome mantra w.r.t. Israel, that Iran “has the right to self-defense.” RBO® is instead blaming Iran for “de-stabilizing” the region, and asking Tehran not to “escalate.” This angers Iranians. They are the victims of Israeli aggression, but are being portrayed as the aggressors. This benefits national unity.
6. National Unity: Iranians, although stressed and concerned, appear in high spirits. On June 14th, a bunch of Tehranis took a sack of popcorn to the roof to enjoy the fireworks, i.e., Iranian AD engaging terrorist drones. Others went to Tochal Mountain (near Tehran) to watch. Iranians took to streets to cheer on IRI AD defense crews as they battled enemy drones. This in contrast to Israelis, cowering in bunkers and subway stations, tweeting silly stuff to the amusement of Twitterati; for example, “we’re in the [bomb] shelter,” “they are f***ing turning us [Israel] into Gaza,” and “Iranians are laughing at us.” Iranians are aware that humanity supports Iran. As a bonus, the civilized world is delighting in the punishment being inflicted on Israel. Australian author Caitlin Johnstone: “Imagine being so evil and reviled that people love watching you get hit.”
Perspectives 
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