Iran, courtesy of Trump and Netanyahu, has achieved nuclear ambiguity. Its nuclear sites and 408kg trove of highly-enriched uranium survive. Mossad/CIA spies (“IAEA inspectors”) have no physical access to sites; CCTV at every site is off. Iran’s nuclear program, formerly the world’s most open and inspected program, has gone black.
Survival of Nuclear Facilities
The Natanz and Isfahan sites suffered surface damage, but key facilities are below ground. Both sites were selected for geography and geology. The Karkas Mountains, where Natanz is located, is composed of granite and gneiss; hard igneous and metamorphic rocks. The geological formation is dense and resistant to penetration, providing solid foundations for the underground tunnels. The Isfahan site is under 45-90 meters of bedrock (limestone and dolomite). Fordow suffered no damage: “Fordow was built below a mountain to withstand nuclear strikes—as China did with ‘Project 816’.”
The Pentagon used Tomahawks or JASSM cruise missiles against edifices at Natanz and Isfahan, but no B-2 stealth bombers penetrated deep into Iranian airspace (see where Fordow is located) and flew back unmolested. Bomb damage analyses by professionals suggests that Tomahawks were used, not GBU-57 “bunker buster” bombs. A propaganda campaign by the U.S. (see “Why Trump’s new ‘Iran strikes’ bluster is just chest-thumping bravado”).
Comments by FM Araghchi, et al., that sites were “severely damaged” is to be taken cum grano salis: under international law, Iran has sound bases for reparations claims. Why not pump up the compensation claim? Almost every major insurance claim is inflated!
Survival of Highly-Enriched Uranium
Iran’s 408kg [Update 4 Sep 2025: 440kg!] stock of 60% HEU was dispersed before the Twelve-Day War began.
“Any nation with a functioning nuclear program and strategic foresight would segment and decentralize storage, use hardened transport containers, often lead-lined and shielded, load materials into ordinary-looking vehicles, like minivans, supply trucks, or refrigerated containers, and disperse them across dozens of sites—some declared, many not. . . Iran almost certainly treats its uranium stocks like any high-value strategic asset: mobile, layered, and difficult to destroy in one strike”
Warhead Technology and Delivery Systems
Iran perfected nuclear warhead technology and has a superb ballistic missile program that can accurately deliver warheads to cities in Israel.
Sensitive Compartmented Information
Israel’s sneak attack of 13 June 2025 proved that Iran’s internal security apparatus, secrecy of its bunkers and movements of political and military leaderships, and communications, were compromised. Since then, information has been compartmentalized—not unlike our “Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information” (TS/SCI) and “Special Access Program” (SAP) designations—blocking political and military leaders from access to information that they do not need to know.
Thus when Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said,
he was assuredly telling the truth. They is no need for Foreign Ministry staff to know: what they do not know cannot be betrayed or accidentally revealed. Iran’s nuclear program, the primary focus of U.S./Israeli attacks, is a “Special Access Program.”
Final Words
Netanyahu is not a strategist; Trump is estranged from facts and cogitation. Tel Aviv and Washington handed Tehran a prize they had desired, but could not obtain after the Iraq War (2003): a secretive nuclear program. Iran needed two decades to master the nuclear cycle (“from the uranium mine to the nuclear power plant”); build underground facilities; develop technical expertise; design nuclear warheads; develop the ballistic missile systems that will deliver warheads; and educate a fresh generation of Iranian scientists. A complete picture of the program is seen by few Iranians. If Iran withdraws from NPT consequent to “Snapback”, it will lower the final curtain on Iran’s nuclear program.
Triggering of “Snapback” is, in part, to compel Iran to allow IAEA’s spies to conduct bomb damage assessments at Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz.1 IAEA’s Director insisted that bombed sites are still subject to IAEA inspections. Israel and Allies want to know (i) what happened to the 408kg [update: 4 Sep 2025, 440kg] of HEU; and (ii) where this stockpile is located so they can bomb Iran (again). Tehran’s response is the diplomatic equivalent of “va fangul!”
- IAEA spies: “The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has admitted in its latest quarterly report that Iran revoked the designation of two of its inspectors after they transferred sensitive documents from Iran’s Fordow nuclear site to Vienna.” See also, Kit Klarenberg, “Spying on Iran: How MI6 infiltrated the IAEA” ↩︎
Perspectives 
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