The wars launched by US and Israel against Iran in 2025 and 2026 handed Tehran the enviable gift of nuclear ambiguity. Pre-war, Iran had the most open nuclear program in the world; today it has the most opaque program. 440.9kg of 60% “highly-enriched uranium” (HEU) survives at scattered sites; there is no single target for US Special Forces (SOF) or USAF to strike. Hoopla about “Pickaxe Mountain” is another instance of manufactured intelligence by Israel.
Where is Iran’s HEU?
This essay updates “Iran’s Nuclear Ambiguity,” published 2 Sep 2025, showing, inter alia, that Iran’s “nuclear sites and 408kg [updated to 440.9kg] trove of highly-enriched uranium survive.”
Trump wants the “nuclear dust” dug out from Isfahan and shipped to the USA, but is any part of Iran’s stockpile of 440.9kg 60% HEU at Isfahan? US SOF’s Easter Weekend “Debacle in the Desert” followed an attempt to seize HEU at Isfahan, but if SOF had succeeded in entering the underground facility, they may have been surprised. We do not know if any HEU was present when Israel bombed the facility on 13 June 2025.
Let’s follow the evidence, which is based on IAEA’s post-inspection statements. Salient IAEA reports include GOV/2025/8 (26 February 2025) and GOV/2025/24 (31 May 2025):
Less than 50% of Iran’s stockpile of 440.9kg 60% HEU was at Isfahan before the Twelve-Day War was ignited by Israel on 13 June 2025. On 09 March 2026, IAEA Director-General Raphael Grossi, said: “What we believe is that Isfahan had until our last inspection [12 February 2025] a bit more than 200 kg…of 60% [HEU].”
However, images taken on 09 June 2025 by an Airbus satellite “show a truck loaded with 18 blue containers going into a tunnel at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center.” Israel bombed the Isfahan facility four days later.
Intellectual Exercise
Question 1: Did trucks with “18 blue containers” relocate some/all of the HEU that had been at Isfahan when the IAEA last inspected it in February 2025?
Question 2: Where is the ≈240kg of 60% HEU (440.90−200kg → ≈240kg) that was not at Isfahan when the Israelis bombed it on 13 June? Was it at Natanz? Or Fordow? Or the “secretive” Pickaxe Mountain facility located at 33.706111, 51.706389? Or Elsewhere?
If we assume the ≈200 kg 60% HEU that Grossi mentioned is still at Isfahan, but the balance (≈240kg 60% HEU) is in safe hands, was it weaponized? Enriched to “weapons-grade” (90% HEU), ≈240kg 60% HEU yields ≈180kg 90% HEU (say, 7–9 warheads). But 60% HEU can also be used to make a nuclear weapon (see “Weaponization,” below)
HEU Storage
The last IAEA verified data from Iran are from before the war (see GOV/2025/50, 3 September 2025). Iran barred IAEA consequent to the bombings of nuclear facilities. IAEA reported that Iran has 440.9kg of 60% HEU. The 440.9kg is not in a “suitcase” that SEAL Team 6 can haul off as “Twitterati” and journalists have opined. 440.9kg is dissolved in 1,000s of kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF₆ gas); and stored in heavy industrial pressure vessels.
A rough estimate for illustrative purposes, based on 2025 IAEA figures:
Weight
≈13,700–14,600kg (total) UF₆ mass. The actual amount of uranium inside the UF₆ gas is ≈9,250–9,875kg. This consists of:
—mostly Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU is 3–5%)
—some Medium-Enriched Uranium (MEU is ≈ 20%)
—440.9kg of 60% HEU
Bulk
UF₆ gas is stored in special cylinders:
(a) Small cylinders (height ≈ 0.8–1.5 m)
—10–150kg UF₆ each, usually 25–55kg for higher-enrichment material
—Bulky steel pressure vessels; require special handling and storage.
(b) Large cylinders (height 2–2.2m, diameter 76–80cm)
—2,200–2,300kg UF₆ each (full weight ≈2,300–2,500kg; forklift or crane required)
What this means is that for ≈14,000kg UF₆, say, 5–8 large cylinders (for the bulk of the material) plus 100–250 small cylinders (for higher-enriched amounts) are needed.
Instead of a “suitcase” that US SOF can capture, hundreds of cylinders weighing 1,000s of kilograms have to be seized and transported. Hence the foolhardiness of the Isfahan operation. Gen. Randy George was right to object to it.
Asset Dispersal
Iran has multiple nuclear sites. It is improbable that ≈14,000kg of UF₆ was parked in one place. Military analyst Mike Mihajlovic: “Who seriously believes that a state like Iran … would keep all of its enriched uranium stockpiles concentrated in a single location? … Iran almost certainly treats its uranium stocks like any high-value strategic asset: mobile, layered, and difficult to destroy in one strike” Précisément.
Weaponization
A nuclear weapon can be devised from 60% HEU, but given the mood in Tehran consequent to the foreign-sponsored riots in January 2026, and Trump’s bellicosity, I would not be surprised if some of the 440.9kg 60% HEU was enriched to 90% HEU (“weapons grade”). Nuclear warhead technology exists in Iran; hence Iran’s “nuclear latency” status, or, to use the popular term, Iran is a “screwdriver’s turn from the bomb.”
Warhead Design
These images were touted by Netanyahu some years ago as a Mossad scoop. However, a more acceptable theory is that Iran leaked them to put US and Israel on notice. This would be a very Iranian strategic move: signal without escalating.
Nuclear Warhead
A nuclear bomb can be manufactured from 60% HEU. This will require 45–70kg of 60% HEU for the core (cf. 25–30kg for 90% HEU). A “first generation pure fission implosion” warhead with all the gizmos that make it go “bang” weighs 1500–2,000kg.
Warhead Delivery
A 60% HEU warhead weighing 2,000kg can be delivered by Khorramshahr-4 . A missile’s range can be reduced to accommodate a heavier warhead by reducing the weight of the fuel that it is carrying. K-4 has >2,000km range, but distance to Israel is <1,500km. In short, K-4 can be scaled to deliver a nuclear warhead to Tel Aviv and Haifa.
The warhead must be designed to fit inside the warhead bay of K-4; the bay is c. 1.3m x c. 4m. This is doable. Is showcasing of Khorramshahr-4 subtle messaging by Tehran? In the aftermath of the Ramazan War, it is clear to military experts that Iran is a missile superpower, immediately behind Russia and China. Iran’s capabilities have been proven on the battlefield.
Pickaxe Mountain
Pickaxe Mountain is located at 33.706111, 51.706389. It is impregnable. A nuclear warhead will do no more than scratch the surface. As I wrote in “Iran’s Underground Military Bases,” sites are selected on the bases of geography and geology.
Israeli Intelligence
Israel has a long history of supplying the United States with false intelligence to manipulate US foreign policy decisions. The Iraq War is the most notorious example (but the Iran War failures are likely to win it the “most notorious” category).
CIA—and the extended intelligence community—frequently develop intelligence assessments that are overridden by Israeli assessments delivered into friendly hands at the White House. On this well-established practice, listen to this episode of “Radio War Nerd EP #629 — Iran War: Pre-War Intelligence + Missile Races…”
Why is Israel pushing the Pickaxe Mountain story now? To get Trump to re-ignite the war. Is there nuclear material at Pickaxe? Perhaps. However, a strike by US with tactical nukes will have consequences beyond the Middle East. Russia and China will see pre-emptive nuclear strikes by the US as doctrine in light of August 2026 DOD plans to transition to a “revised nuclear strategy that emphasizes the potential use of shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons in regional conflicts against Russia or China.” Iran will test a nuclear device.